The Factors Affecting the Location of Foreign Direct Investment by U.S. Companies Pre and Post 9-11 by Newton, Brent Alexander & Mileski, Joan P.
   
 
THE FACTORS AFFECTING THE LOCATION OF FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT BY U.S. COMPANIES PRE AND POST 9-11 
 
A Senior Scholars Thesis                                                                                                        
by                                                                                                                                    
BRENT ALEXANDER NEWTON  
 
Submitted to the Office of Undergraduate Research                                                        
Texas A&M University                                                                                                          
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the designation as  
 







Major: Maritime Administration 
   
 
THE FACTORS AFFECTING THE LOCATION OF FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT BY U.S. COMPANIES PRE AND POST 9-11 
A Senior Scholars Thesis                                                                                                    
by                                                                                                                                    





Submitted to the Office of Undergraduate Research                                                        
Texas A&M University                                                                                                            
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for designation as 
 
UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH SCHOLAR 
 
Approved by:                                                                                                                     
Research Advisor:                                            Joan Mileski              








The Factors Affecting the Location of Foreign Direct Investment by U.S. Companies  
Pre and Post 9-11 (April 2008) 
 
Brent Alexander Newton 
Department of Maritime Administration 
Texas A&M University 
 
Research Advisor: Dr. Joan Mileski 
Department of Maritime Administration 
 
 
This research examines the motivational factors that influence the location of U.S. 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in a post 9-11 world.  Market factors, in the past, have 
been a dominant motivation in choosing a location for investment. Political stability of 
the host location has also been a factor. Political stability refers to the characteristics of a 
country that provide U.S. firms with a sense of security, such as a consistent legal 
system and a stable government friendly to the U.S. This research looks at whether 
political stability is the dominant driving force in the location of U.S. FDI post 9-11. 
This hypothesis is tested through a comparison of the location characteristics of all the 
world‟s countries pre and post 9-11 where the U.S. has reported investments. Using data 
provided by Dunn and Bradstreet Investor Information Service for 1995, 2000 and 2005, 
I use ordinary linear regression analysis. Results, in fact, show that political
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stability is a driving force for post 9-11 U.S. FDI.  Further, this research compares past 
studies in order to explain differences in U.S. FDI in a pre and post 9-11 world.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
Prior research shows that investment choice is based on a certain set of conditions. 
Particularly noteworthy is John H. Dunning‟s OLI Paradigm, which suggests that a 
firm‟s participation in foreign value-adding activities is determined by the existence of 
three conditions (Dunning, 1993). These conditions include ownership-specific 
advantages (O), location-specific variables (L) and internalization-incentive advantages 
(I).  
 
Each component of Dunning‟s OLI Paradigm may be explained further. For example, 
ownership-specific advantages (O) refer to the special characteristics of a firm that 
potentially set it above and apart from competition in a host country, such as property 
rights, management expertise, technical innovations and human capital. Location-
specific variables (L) refer to the unique features that make a country attractive or 
unattractive for investment, such as availability of natural resources, cost of labor, trade 
barriers, quality of infrastructure, and style of government. Finally, internalization-
incentive advantages (I) refer to the opportunities available for protecting against or 
exploiting market failure in a country, such as avoiding costs, avoiding government 
intervention and controlling supply.  
 
This thesis follows the style and format of the Journal of International Business Studies.
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According to Dunning‟s OLI Paradigm, there are four factors that determine why 
locations are selected for foreign direct investment (FDI). The first factor is resource 
based, which involves firms seeking advantages such as access to capital and natural 
resources, stability of supply and control of markets. The second factor is market based, 
which involves firms seeking advantages such as information skills, management 
expertise, low labor cost, investment incentives, low transaction cost and buyer 
uncertainty. The third factor is efficiency based, which involves firms seeking security 
advantages such as economies of scope, product specialization, production incentives, 
common governance and vertical integration. The final factor is strategic based, which 
involves firms seeking advantages such as market access, product distribution, access to 
sources of inputs, close proximity to customers and protection of input quality and 
performance.  
 
Research has confirmed that attractive location factors increase FDI. Prime examples of 
such research include Guisinger and Associates (1985) and Mileski (2000). However, 
these studies were conducted before 9-11, an event that has proved to be enormously 
influential, both politically and economically. In addition, post 9-11 research on 
international investment activities lacks an in-depth investigation of possible change in 
location factors of FDI.   
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There is evidence that the global environment affects international investment. Prior 
research has shown that global events impact firms‟ choice of investment, as well as 
investment factors. Particularly noteworthy is the research conducted in Mileski (2000), 
which proved that key events affecting the international oil supply altered companies‟ 
location of foreign investment. As one of the most significant global events in the last 50 
years, 9-11 shows potential for affecting international investment activities. 
Consequently, it is very important that the impact of 9-11 on location of investment and 
FDI flows be addressed. 
 
We explore the following research questions in this paper: “Do the factors that affected 
investment location prior to 9-11 also affect post 9-11 investment?” and “Is there greater 
emphasis on certain factors pre and post 9-11?” We test these questions through analysis 
of international investment data provided by the Dunn and Bradstreet Investor 
Information Service. This international investment data contains information on country 
characteristics, such as style of government, market growth, trade barriers, infrastructure, 
available technology, investment incentives, and international alliances, as well as other 
information relevant to each country‟s political, economic, and cultural systems. With 
this research, we intend to confirm our hypothesis that the same location factors that 
drove investment prior to 9-11 will drive investment post 9-11. In addition, we seek to 
support the hypothesis that more emphasis will be placed on efficiency factors rather 
than market factors, due to increased concern for security.       




  EVALUATION OF FDI RESEARCH AND THEORY    
As U.S. companies continue to find themselves competing in an increasingly globalized 
marketplace, the subject of foreign direct investment (FDI) becomes ever more relevant. 
After all, FDI offers potential opportunities for profit, growth, promotion, product line 
creation and expansion of market share to investing U.S. companies (Dikova and 
Witteloostuijn, 2007). Furthermore, FDI offers potential benefits to host countries, such 
as increased efficiency, greater product variety and improved productivity (Globerman 
and Shapiro, 2003). As a result, FDI can be advantageous to both U.S. firms and host 
countries, causing it to be a very important activity in the global economy. Considering 
the great importance of FDI, it is not surprising that much research has been conducted 
on this topic. Consequently, there have been a variety of theories applied to the broad 
area of international investment.  
 
However, I am interested in comparing the location characteristics of different countries. 
For this reason, this paper will explore Dunning‟s OLI Paradigm on foreign direct 
investment (Dunning, 1993). This paradigm is significant for two reasons. First, it 
provides a framework for evaluating country characteristics as they relate to influencing 
the location of FDI. Second, Dunning provides a framework for evaluating multinational 
firms‟ investment choices and he presumes that there are four basic motivations for
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choosing one location over another. These four motivations include resource-based, 
market-based, efficiency-based, and strategy-based. 
 
The OLI Paradigm requires the satisfaction of three conditions in order for FDI to occur. 
First, a firm must possess ownership-specific advantages (O) that potentially set it above 
and apart from competition in a host country. According to Dunning, this (O) refers to 
the tacit knowledge, capabilities and/or competencies that give certain firms sustainable 
competitive advantage over other firms.  
 
Second, a firm must have access to the location-specific variables (L) that make a host 
country attractive for investment. As explained by Dunning, when a firm goes to a 
location, it must be able to exploit its ownership-specific advantages. Thus, the (L) 
represents the marriage of a firm‟s advantages with the specific location‟s characteristics 
that are found there.  
 
Third, there must be market failure present in order for the firm to decide to internalize, 
giving rise to internalization-incentive advantages (I). Here, Dunning explains that when 
a firm decides to exploit its ownership-specific advantages (O) in a certain location, it 
does so by internalizing them. For example, a firm may choose to have a wholly-owned 
subsidiary versus exporting, licensing, etc. In other words, a firm will choose to
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internalize (I) when there are various reasons why it is better for the firm to own the 
investment than not own it.  
 
In addition, Dunning argues that as a fourth condition, a firm must believe that the FDI 
in question is consistent with its long-term management strategy (Dunning, 1977 and 
1980). If all of these conditions occur for the investing firm, the firm will probably 
initiate FDI.  
 
For this paper, I will focus on the location (L) part of the OLI Paradigm. In particular, I 
am going to investigate what makes an (L) a “good (L),” or, attractive for FDI. In doing 
so, I will verify and examine what drives a firm to go to one location over another; in 
order to exploit their ownership-specific advantages (O) as they internalize (I).   
 
A particularly important attribute of the OLI Paradigm is its identification of location 
factors. Under his paradigm, Dunning identifies certain motivations for locating in a 
particular (L). These include natural resource-seeking, market-seeking, efficiency-
seeking, and strategic asset or capability-seeking. Mileski (1994) effectively 
operationalized and tested each of these motivation types. For example, resource-seeking 
firms are motivated to invest in a country for the resources present that include things 
like physical resources, human resources and operational resources, such as land, oil,
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infrastructure and inexpensive labor. Market-seeking firms are motivated to invest in a 
country by the market advantages offered, such as economic stability, consumer 
demand, increased market share and potential for growth. Efficiency-seeking firms are 
motivated to invest in a country by the amount security offered to the firm in the form of 
legal and political advantages offered, such as common governance, familiar legal 
system, few trade barriers and economies of scope and scale. Finally, strategic asset or 
capability-seeking firms are motivated to invest in a country by the strategic advantages 
offered, such as market access, input access and product distribution. 
 
The point of this paper is to expand this research. Loree and Guisinger (1995) and 
Mileski (2000) have confirmed that firms do in fact locate their foreign investments in 
host countries that have these factors. This was empirically confirmed to be true for 
countries showing positive factors, such as good resources, good market conditions, 
efficient markets, strategic advantages, etc.  
 
However, these findings are supported by data entirely from post-World War II research, 
including Cold War era and pre-9-11 era research. In light of this fact, I ask the question 
“Does the OLI Paradigm hold when the world has gone into what could be perceived as 
World War III?” There has been a major shift in political stability, based on the events of 
9-11; yet, there has not been any research that has really tested whether this paradigm is 
going to hold after a major event such as 9-11. In addition, there has not been a
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substantial world shock and political stability change since 9-11, worldwide. It should 
also be noted that the U.S. is the leading investor abroad, or, “big dog” of FDI 
(Congressional Research Service, 2006). This leads me to also ask the question “Since 
the „big dog‟ was directly attacked in 9-11, does this change the paradigm?” I also ask 
“Does this event have an impact on how the U.S. invests as the largest investor of FDI?”  
 
The argument posed by this paper is that of all the motivational factors, political stability 
will be the most preferred, post 9-11. The underlying premise of why firms engage in 
FDI is unchanged. However, I anticipate that political stability will be much more 
relevant to U.S. firms post 9-11 than resource, market, or strategic factors. This is 
because I acknowledge that the U.S. experienced severe trauma in 9-11. Accordingly, I 
presume that U.S. firms will desire to invest in countries that provide them with a sense 
of security. In this case, security would mean a familiar government and legal system, 
such as what these firms would find in the U.S. Post 9-11 research supports this 
possibility. Globerman and Shapiro (2003) found that countries that receive no U.S. FDI 
are usually those with weak governance structures and legal systems not rooted in 
English common law.  
 
With the above argument and questions in mind, I have developed four basic hypotheses. 
First, if a country is more politically similar to the U.S., then it will see more U.S. FDI 
after 9-11. Second, if resources were the motivation for investing in a country before 9-
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11, it will be less significant after 9-11. Third, if market was the motivation for investing 
in a country before 9-11, then it will be less significant after 9-11. Fourth, if strategic 
advantage was the motivation for investing in a country before 9-11, then it will be less 
significant.   
 
My methodology for testing the above-mentioned hypotheses is provided in the 
following chapter. I also provide information on the variables considered.        
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CHAPTER III 
FDI RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this section is to describe the methodology used to test the research 
questions and the hypotheses derived from them. First, certain constructs are 
operationalized into measures before the analysis or testing is done. The following steps 
are followed in the testing procedures.   
 
Step 1  - Define country characteristics measures - This step provides the independent 
variables that are used in the analyses. A data reduction strategy includes testing each 
combination of variables for correlation through the use of Pearson correlation 
coefficients and selecting the combination, which exhibits the least amount of 
collinearity among the independent variables.  
 
Step 2 - Define controls - This step provides the control variables to be used in 
determining what influences FDI attraction.  
 
Step 3 - Define FDI measures - This step provides the FDI levels (attraction 
performance) dependent variables to be used in the analyses.  
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Step 4- Test FDI performance through Generalized Least Squares of policy measures 
and country characteristics to FDI level to period. Additionally, control for the direct 
effects for FDI levels is included.   
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
There were four basic hypotheses tested in this research. First, if a country is more 
politically (representing the efficiency motivation) similar to the U.S., then it will see 
more U.S. FDI after 9-11. Second, if resources were the motivation for investing in a 
country before 9-11, it will be less significant after 9-11. Third, if market was the 
motivation for investing in a country before 9-11, then it will be less significant after 9-
11. Fourth, if strategic advantage was the motivation for investing in a country before 9-
11, then it will be less significant.   
 
A number of independent variables were used to operationalize each of these constructs. 
In order to operationalize the construct of efficiency motivation in the first hypothesis, I 
used whether a country has a democratic form of government and whether the country 
has a managed market system.  Efficiency can be defined as efficiency in legal 
structures.  U.S. investors are most familiar with democratic structures and therefore 
would find more efficiency in countries that are politically similar.  In order to 
operationalize the construct of resource motivation in the second hypothesis, I used the 
infrastructure, presence of resources and the climate and size characteristic variables of 
country area, the presence of a tropical climate, the presence of a subtropical climate, the 
presence of a temperate climate, the presence of oil and the amount of seaports/cities. In
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order to operationalize the construct of market motivation in the third hypothesis, I used 
the demand variables of population size and GNP. Finally, in order to operationalize the 
construct of strategic advantage motivation in the fourth hypothesis, I used the variable 
of the number of memberships in supranational organizations showing the importance of 
strategic alliances. 
 
The results of this research are shown in the table on the following pages. A number of 
observations were made. Country area was significant for all three years at the .01 level, 
meaning the larger the country, the higher the FDI. Tropical climate was significant in 
2000 at the .1 level, meaning the warmer the country, the lower the FDI.  Tropical 
climate is dissimilar to most the U.S. climate. Population size was significant in 1995 at 
the .01 level and in 2005 at the .05 level, meaning the lower the population, the higher 
the FDI. GNP was significant in 1995 at the .05 level, meaning the greater the GNP, the 
higher the FDI. Finally, democracy government was significant in 2005 at the .1 level, 
meaning the presence of a democratic government increased FDI.  
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Table 1. Parameter Estimates and Standard Errors for Independent Variables 
Independent   Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
Variables 1995  2000  2005 
        
Resource       
        
Country area 0.00412  0.00725  0.01433 
  .00129***  .00186***  0.00310*** 
        
Tropical climate -5565.01259  -14694  -16413 
  5248.41084  7537.00208*  13591 
        
Subtropical climate -1737.89857  8983.01502  -15594 
  5126.33189  8170.53618  14686 
        
Temperate climate 467.49059  2827.09271  -1761.42552 
  6325.61717  7746.47128  14521 
 
Presence of Oil 4198.10991  -2881.17383  -16693 
  4637.49051  7902.56098  14091 
        
Seaports/cities -14.6498  -90.62686  -18.52689 
  14.53849  93.36729  19.12576 
        
Market        
        
Population size -0.00003343  0.0001523  -0.00006973 
  0.00001140***  0.00008964  0.00002920** 
        
GNP 26.40861  -35.37352  -51.80775 
  12.51713**  38.93382  77.99779 
        
Efficiency       
        
Democracy government 4810.52937  250225  30757 
  6240.82636  103297  18057* 
        
Managed market system -1395.75918  -10809  -15188 
  4299.83204  7009.59425  13832 
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Table 1 Continued 
 
 
It should be noted that the variables of country area, tropical climate, subtropical 
climate, temperate climate, seaports/cities, population size, GNP, democracy 
government, managed market system, and memberships in supranational organizations 
were obtained from the Dunn and Bradstreet Exporters‟ Encyclopedia. The variable of 
presence of oil and the level of FDI by country was obtained from the U.S. Department 
of Commerce.    
 
These results confirm my first hypothesis at the .1 level and my third hypothesis at the 
.05 level. However, these results do not confirm my second and fourth hypotheses.   
Independent 
Variables 
        Model 1 
           1995  
   Model 2 
      2000  
      Model 3 
         2005 
 
 
Strategic       
        
Memberships in supranational 
organizations  -531.92107  -813.80728  -5230.9862 
  1141.40381  1060.80353  3285.95038 
        
Adjusted R-Square 0.3582  0.4311  0.3143 
        
N 46  41  53 
        
*** indicates p-value of .01 or less       
** indicates p-value of .05 or less       
* indicates p-value of .1 or less           




In short, these findings support that U.S. firms were more concerned with market issues 
than efficiency (security) issues pre 9-11; and that U.S. firms are more concerned with 
efficiency (security) issues than market issues post 9-11. Furthermore, I found that the 
factors of resources, market, and strategic may be important, but political stability is now 
a major driving force for U.S. foreign direct investment in a post 9-11 world. This 
information not only helps to explain international investment activity by U.S. firms, but 
also helps decision-makers to review locations for investment.       
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